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REVIEW ESSAY
desperately seeking a new dr. strangelove
Sam J. Tangredi
The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, 
America’s Top Secret Military Research Agency, by Annie  
Jacobsen. New York: Little, Brown, 2015. 552 pages. $30.
As with many histories written by journalists, The Pentagon’s Brain promises 
more than it delivers. The hype begins with the subtitle’s promise of “an uncen-
sored history”—as if there is any real means by which the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), an overt government agency that makes no 
effort to hide its existence, could censor a report that is based on interviews and 
open sources. The fact that the Internet and the Global Positioning System origi-
nally were created with funding provided by ARPA (DARPA’s original name—the 
“Defense” was added later to identify to whom the agency belonged)—is com-
mon and repeated knowledge, and something in which DARPA takes pride. 
The author’s claim (p. 5) that it is “one of the most 
secretive and, until this book, the least investi-
gated” military science agencies is true only in 
that DARPA has received media attention only 
infrequently. Nothing particularly nefarious goes 
on in the agency itself, which (as the book admits) 
consists of about 120 program managers with aca-
demic backgrounds who fund classified research 
projects conducted by universities, think tanks, 
and defense industries. DARPA itself does no re-
search, and the ideas for the research it does fund 
usually are prompted and sponsored by other de-
fense agencies. DARPA is, in fact, boring—which 
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is probably why there have been few nongovernment books about its history. It is 
just hard to find a new Dr. Strangelove at DARPA.
The research DARPA does fund is indeed interesting and certainly worthy of 
examination. However, the book approaches this examination as if conducting 
an exposé and tries to suggest that some of these projects—whose particulars are 
classified, but whose general subject matter is apparent—constitute threats to 
humanity. It does this by linking the development of hydrogen weapons—with 
which DARPA had no involvement—with the agency’s current focus on artificial 
intelligence, to which the author refers as developing “killer robots.” The initial 
link is the fact that Herbert F. York, one of the scientists involved in developing 
the hydrogen bomb, became the first full director of ARPA/DARPA in 1958. Like 
many atomic scientists, York later regretted his involvement in nuclear weapons 
development and was a strong proponent of arms control; in contrast, York’s 
autobiography makes his time at ARPA seem quite fun. However, the author of 
this book spends much of the opening chapters discussing pre-1958 nuclear tests 
and the threat the resulting radiation represented. It takes some time for her to 
sort out which projects ARPA/DARPA actually initiated and which were under 
the control of other agencies of the Defense Department.
Jacobsen does identify the start of ARPA/DARPA efforts with the 1958 ARPA 
Study No. 1, which gathered together a group of defense scientists “‘to identify 
problems not now receiving adequate attention’ [York’s words] in the national 
security domain” (p. 65). For reasons unexplained, the group gave itself the 
mysterious title of “Project 137.” Thus, ARPA/DARPA began with a logical effort 
to determine whether scientific developments of the time constituted threats 
to American security. In the era of Sputnik, such developments were certainly 
apparent.
However, ARPA/DARPA did not always back the right horse. One of York’s 
first hires was Nicholas C. Christofilos, an elevator-repair technician and erst-
while self-taught scientist who claimed that high-energy electrons trapped in the 
earth’s magnetic field above the atmosphere could act as an antiballistic missile 
defense. Christofilos’s reputation rested on the fact that in 1948 he sent a letter to 
the University of California Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley describing the idea 
of a nuclear particle–accelerating synchrocyclotron, something that had been in-
vented only a few years previously. The letter apparently contained no engineer-
ing details, and was put aside. But in 1950 he sent a letter describing a different 
type of accelerator, similar to one that would only be built several years later. With 
a little self-promotion, Christofilos became viewed as a “strange kind of genius,” 
one whose ideas should not be ignored. To generate the high-energy electrons, 
a small nuclear warhead was launched from the test ship USS Norton Sound in 
the South Atlantic, but the “Christofilos effect” did not occur. The author tries to 
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portray this as “the world’s first test of an electromagnetic pulse bomb (EMP)” 
(p. 71), but the EMP effect was already known, though not fully understood, and 
there is no evidence that EMP was examined during that particular test.
Evidence, or rather the lack of it, is what makes the book weak. Despite an 
extensive bibliography, Jacobsen bases her work primarily on over seventy in-
terviews she conducted with former ARPA/DARPA members—as well as others 
having no direct connection to DARPA. Many of the subjects were in their seven-
ties, eighties, or nineties—and ready to tell a good story. This biases her toward 
human-interest tales that often characterize people as heroes or villains. In a 
section on social-science research the RAND Corporation conducted in Vietnam 
in 1963, funded by ARPA, she finds her second “militarists not listening to the 
qualms of scientists” story (hydrogen weapons being the first). The RAND study 
averred that the Strategic Hamlet Program then being pursued inevitably would 
fail. In Jacobsen’s version, higher Pentagon officials pressured Harold Brown, 
the then ARPA director and future Secretary of Defense, to suppress the study 
and rebuke RAND’s leadership. But this interpretation is that of the scientists in-
volved, who were dismayed that while they briefed Brown on their findings “[he] 
turned his heavy chair around and looked out the window[,] leaving us to talk to 
the back of his chair.” Jacobsen does note (p. 141) that “perhaps Brown was simply 
contemplating the severity of the situation,” but the urge to turn this into a good-
versus-bad confrontation is too much for her to resist. This tendency continues 
through an extensive discussion of other Vietnam projects, such as “Jason,” the 
failed attempt to create an “electronic fence” of sensors to detect North Vietnam-
ese infiltration through the jungles. She finds quite a number of Vietnam veterans 
to interview about such improbable schemes and inevitable failures; however, 
she does interview them with considerable respect for their service and bravery.
There is an additional problem with Jacobsen’s reliance on interviews. Some 
of the statements made by those involved are not drawn from direct interviews 
but culled from autobiographies, oral histories, and other articles. However, it is 
difficult to determine which actually were conducted by the author and which 
were not, leaving the reader to wonder about the context of these statements. For 
example, the book contains many remarks by Herbert York, who died in 2009. 
It is likely that many of them come from his autobiography or other previous 
sources, but the author does not identify them in that fashion.
If one were to conclude that The Pentagon’s Brain is less a history and more 
a collection of human-interest stories strung together, he or she would be right. 
Some of the stories are indeed interesting; others are quite absurd. In addition 
to that of Christofilos, some other DARPA hires seem inexplicable. DARPA 
contracted retired admiral John M. Poindexter (after the Iran-Contra scandal) to 
serve as director of its Information Awareness Office, supervising a data-mining 
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effort called the Total Information Awareness project that critics saw as threaten-
ing civil liberties, and actually let him testify about it in front of the Senate. The 
testimony turned into a shouting match with Senate staffers; it was neither a wise 
nor a happy day for DARPA.
But a string of human-interest stories does not make a history. In fact, several 
of the human-interest stories seem to have no obvious connection to DARPA, 
particularly a lengthy section about a catastrophic brain injury suffered by Allen 
M. Dulles (son of CIA director Allen W. Dulles) in the Korean War that resulted 
in permanent short-term memory loss. Although the author spends considerable 
time interviewing Dulles and his family, the only possible linkage provided—
much later in the book (p. 421)—is DARPA’s funding of research “around trying 
to restore mind and memories of brain-wounded warriors.” No such research 
ever was conducted on Dulles himself.
The book concludes with a portrayal of current DARPA funding for drones, 
robots, artificial intelligence, and autonomous vehicles that is intended to cause 
alarm. As Jacobsen juxtaposes, “This book begins with scientists testing a weapon 
that at least some of them thought was an ‘evil thing’ [hydrogen bomb]. . . . This 
book ends with scientists inside the Pentagon working to create autonomous 
weapons systems, and scientists outside the Pentagon working to spread the 
idea that these weapons systems are inherently evil things, that artificially in-
telligent hunter-killer robots can and will outsmart their human creators, and 
against which there will be no defense” (p. 452). This is indeed a serious debate 
to examine, but Jacobsen interviews only three opposed scientists and relies on 
a single report. She does not develop the debate fully, and it certainly transcends 
a discussion of DARPA.
Perhaps the disconnections in the book simply point to the fact that its initial 
premise is wrong. A brain decides how to direct action, then other organs carry 
out the tasks. The Office of the Secretary of Defense—carrying out the will of the 
president and the funding of Congress—decides and directs the action; DARPA 
fills out the paperwork and moves the money. DARPA is not the Pentagon’s 
brain; that resides elsewhere. As for this book, an actual history of DARPA also 
lies elsewhere.
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